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Introduction
In last three decades, many encryption methods have been proposed to protect digital images and videos. They are useful for providing special security demands in real applications, such as multimedia message services, pay TV, video teleconferencing, medical imaging, military image databases, etc. Most schemes aim to realize sufficiently fast encryption algorithms with an acceptable level of security. For the state of the art of image and video encryption, the readers are referred to Refs. 1-3. Note that many image and video encryption schemes are not sufficiently secure and can be broken via some efficient attack methods. So, one should be very careful to find a suitable solution for a real application of image encryption.
Since most digital images are stored and transmitted in a compressed format, many image encryption schemes are designed by incorporating encryption into compression. To achieve a better balance between encryption and compression, some researchers developed new compression algorithms to benefit encryption. In Ref. 4 , a joint compression-encryption scheme was proposed, based on a base-switching (BS) lossless compression algorithm that was proposed by the same authors in Ref. 5 . This scheme works on 3 × 3 subimages. In the compression stage, a 7-bit base value is obtained to represent each subimage, and in the encryption stage the base value is substituted via a polynomial mapping function or bitwise XOR operations, which is controlled by the secret key. To further enhance the security, feedback from previous subimages is also used. It was claimed that the joint compression-encryption scheme had a much higher level of security than some other designs proposed in Refs. 6-9. Though the joint compression-encryption scheme has been proposed for many years, no cryptanalysis work has been reported. In this work, we restudy the security of this scheme. We found that it is not as secure as claimed. 4 The following conclusions are reached: 1. its key space size was greatly overestimated by the designers; and 2. the scheme is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks. Some minor problems and errors in Ref. 4 are also been pointed out.
This work is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief introduction to the joint compression-encryption scheme is given and some minor problems of the scheme are discussed. The cryptanalysis of the polynomialbased encryption scheme is given in Sec. 3, with a real example of the chosen-plaintext attack of the scheme.
The cryptanalysis of the XOR-based encryption scheme is given in Sec. 4 , and the last section concludes this study.
Joint Compression-Encryption Scheme
The scheme is a simple combination of the BS lossless compression algorithm and a substitution cipher with plaintext feedback. Both of the two stages work on 3 × 3 subimages. In the following, we separately introduce the two stages. For more details on the scheme, see Refs. 4, 5.
Compression Algorithm
The basic idea of the BS lossless compression algorithm is as follows. Given a 3 × 3 subimage represented by
denote the minimal pixel value by m = min(g) and the base value by b = max(g) − min(g) + 1, and then represent the subimage as an 9-digit number with the radix b:
where g i = g i − m ∈ {0, · · · , b − 1}. Then, one can represent the original 3 × 3 subimage as {b; m; g }, which needs at most 16 + log 2 b 9 bits to store if two bytes are used to represent b and m, respectively. Since for most subimages b is sufficiently small, 16 + log 2 b 9 will be less than 8 × 9 = 72, which is the original bit size of g. This makes it possible to use a number of radix b to represent the original subimage, and it leads to a lossless compression of the image.
The previous idea does not work well when b 75. In this case, 16 + log 2 b 9 > 72, so the bit size of the subimage is expanded, not compressed. To overcome this problem, the authors of Ref. 4 suggested three different rules to realize the compression algorithm, according to the value of b, as follows:
• Rule 1: when 1 b 11, the encoding format is {b; m; g }, where b is represented as a 7-bit integer.
• Rule 2: when 12 b 127, the encoding format is {b; m; P (i min , i max );ĝ }, where b is represented as a 7-bit integer, P (i min , i max ) is a 7-bit integer used to denote the positions of the minimal and the maximal pixel-values 1 , andĝ is the 7-digit number with the radix b obtained by removing the minimal and the maximal pixel values.
• Rule 3: when 128 b 256, the encoding format is {128; g}, where 128 is a "dummy" base value represented as a 7-bit integer (0000000) 2 (which is not used in the previous two rules) 2 .
It is easy to calculate that at most 7 + 8 + log 2 11 9 = 47 bits are needed in rule 1, and at most 7 + 8 + 7 + log 2 127 7 = 71 bits are needed in rule 2. Though 79 bits are needed in rule 3, i.e., seven more bits are needed, generally an image can still be compressed effectively, since only a few percent of subimages satisfy b 128 in most natural images.
Encryption Algorithm
After the previous compression stage, the 7-bit base value of each subimage is encrypted via one polynomial mapping over {1, · · · , 128} as follows 3 :
where K = {k 0 , · · · , k n } serves as the secret key. To make a unique decryption of b possible, f must be a bijective mapping over {1, · · · , 128}. Then, the decryption procedure can be represented by
To further enhance the security of the previous basic scheme, plaintext feedback was suggested in a t-layer scheme to encrypt the p'th subimage:
where f 1 , · · · , f t are t polynomial mappings. In this enhanced scheme, the secret key K is composed of the secret parameters of the t polynomial mappings:
where n 1 , · · · , n t are degrees of f 1 , · · · , f t , respectively. To correctly decrypt the base value b, only f 1 needs to be a bijective mapping over {1, · · · , 128}, and the decryption procedure becomes:
In Sec. 3.2 of Ref. 4 , it was claimed that the key space of the basic scheme is 128!, since there are 128! bijective mappings over {1, · · · , 128}. Similarly, in the enhanced scheme, the key space was claimed to be (128!) t for grayscaled images and (128!) 3t for RGB color images. In Sec. 3.3 of Ref. 4 , as an example, t was assumed to be the number of all subimages in a 512 × 512 image, and it was shown that the key space is (128!) 512/3 × 512/3 , which was claimed to be much larger than the key spaces of the image encryption schemes proposed 6-9 (see Table 1 of Ref. 4) . However, in this paper, we demonstrate that the prior claims on the key space of the joint compression-encryption scheme are all wrong. We also point out that the scheme is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
Besides the previous schemes based on polynomials modulo 128, the one-time pad is also suggested to realize the encryption function:
, where ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR and k is a 7-bit key. In this case, the enhanced scheme should also be accordingly changed to realize the encryption and decryption functions. However, in Ref. 4 it was not mentioned how to do so. Without loss of generality, in this work we assume that the encryption function is modified as follows:
Simpler Representation of Polynomial-Based Scheme
By replacing the base value b by (b−1) mod 128 and f (b) by [f (b)−1] mod 128, the polynomial-based encryption scheme can be represented in a simpler form. Note that such a modification makes no any influence on the encryption/decryption procedures and the security of the encryption scheme. In this case, the set of all possible base values becomes {0, · · · , 127}, and the encryption function in Eq. (3) becomes
The polynomial-based enhanced scheme can also be simplified in a similar way. With the prior representation, the polynomial-based encryption scheme is actually based on "permutation polynomials modulo 128" (see Chap. 4 of Ref. 10 and also Refs. 11-13) 4 , which are defined as follows and have been used in some existing ciphers, including the well-known RSA public-key cipher.
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Definition 1 An integer polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a n x n of degree n modulo m is called a permutation polynomial of degree n modulo m if it induces a bijection over {0, · · · , m − 1}, i.e., ∀x 1 
The cryptanalysis results given in this work is mainly based on the mathematical results on permutation polynomials modulo m and another kind of integer polynomial, -null polynomials modulo m (see Definition 2).
Definition 2 An integer polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a n x n of degree n modulo m is called a null polynomial of degree n modulo m if ∀x ∈ Z, f (x) ≡ 0 (mod m).
Due to the extreme complexity of the underlying mathematical problems, it is impossible to include all the mathematical results and the lengthy deduction in this cryptanalysis work. Instead, we give a complete discussion on permutation polynomials modulo m in Ref. 11 
Remarks on Some Minor Problems of the Scheme
We close this section by pointing out a few minor problems of the scheme proposed in Ref. 4 , leaving the major task of cryptanalysis to the rest of the work. 
Two minor errors
. Fortunately, this error does not influence the algorithm at all. In Sec. 2.2 of this work, we have already unified the format of g by adopting the second format:
i .
Stream cipher or block cipher?
In Sec. 1 of Ref. 4 , it was said that "our method is a kind of stream cipher." However, in our opinion, the joint compression-encryption scheme is more like a block cipher than a stream cipher. At first, let us consider the basic scheme, in which each base value is encrypted in a fixed method independent of its position. However, in most cryptography literature, a stream cipher is defined as follows:
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"In cryptography, a stream cipher is a symmetric cipher in which the plaintext digits are encrypted one at a time, and in which the transformation of successive digits varies during the encryption."
Another definition given in Ref. 31 says that a stream cipher encrypts texts with internal memory, while a block cipher is memoryless. As a typical feature, in a stream cipher, generally a long keystream is generated from a short secret key and then is used to encrypt the plaintext bit by bit. In the basic joint compression-encryption scheme, there does not exists such a keystream. So, we believe that the basic scheme should be a 7-bit block cipher, not a stream cipher. As shown later in the next section, the insecurity of the encryption scheme is partially caused by the extremely short block size.
The enhanced scheme is a little more complicated. The use of plaintext feedback makes the encryption dependent on the position of each subimage. However, a long keystream is still not involved in this scheme. The secret key is directly used to control min(p, t) transformations exerted on min(p, t) base values. We believe that the enhanced scheme is also more like a block cipher than a stream cipher.
Error-propagation problem
The use of plaintext feedback makes the scheme sensitive to errors in the ciphertext: if one error occurs in a position, all the following plain pixels will be influenced and cannot be correctly decrypted with a high probability. In addition, the encipher and the decipher will lose synchronization, if the bit size of one base value is wrongly decoded. This damages all decryption results after the synchronization loss occurs. It means that the encryption scheme can only be used in noise-free situations. By changing plaintext feedback to ciphertext feedback, this problem can be fixed.
Cryptanalysis of Polynomial-Based Encryption Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the polynomial-based encryption scheme applied to gray-scaled images. The obtained results can be easily generalized to RGB color images by considering each RGB image as three independent grayscaled images.
Key Space
In the encryption scheme under study, the key is used to generate a bijective mapping through integer polynomials. So the size of the key space is equal to the number of all distinct bijective mappings 6 that can be generated from all distinct keys.
In Ref. 4 , the key space of the basic scheme is simply estimated as the number of all distinct bijective mappings over {1, · · · , 128}: 128!. However, this estimation is just the upper bound of the key space, due to the following facts: 11 1. not all bijections can be induced by polynomials modulo 128; 2. not all polynomials can induce bijections over {1, · · · , 128}; and 3. different polynomials may induce the same bijection over {1, · · · , 128}, i.e., there exist equivalent polynomials modulo 128.
In the following, based on theoretical results on permutation polynomials obtained in Ref. 11 , we give an exact estimation of the size of the key space, which is actually much smaller than the upper bound 128!. Without loss of generality, we adopt Eq. (7) as the encryption function here to simplify the discussion.
Before introducing the useful results in Ref. 11, we first give some preliminary definitions.
Definition 3 Given two integer polynomials of degree n:
Definition 4 A set of polynomials of degree n (or n) modulo m is a complete system of polynomial residues of degree n modulo m, if for every polynomial of degree n (or n) modulo m there is one and only one congruent polynomial in this set.
Definition 5
Denote ω 1 (m) the least integer n 1 such that there exists a monic null polynomial of degree n modulo m and call it the least monic null polynomial of degree n modulo m.
Based on the previous definitions, let us introduce some notations. In each complete system of polynomial residues of degree n modulo p d , denote the number of permutation polynomials of degree n modulo p d by N pp ( n, p d ), and the number of all integer polynomials of degree
Similarly, denote the number of null polynomials of degree n modulo p d by N np ( n, p d ), and the number of all distinct permutations (bijective mapping) induced from all polynomials of degree n modulo m by 
Theorem 2 Assume p is a prime and
Since two congruent polynomials modulo m induce the same mapping modulo m, N b ( n, 2 7 ) actually denotes the number of all possible encryption functions induced from polynomials of degree n modulo 128 shown in Eq. (7). Since there are n + 1 coefficients in a polynomial of degree n modulo p d , one can easily calculate that
When p = 2 and d = 7 > 2p − 1 = 3, i.e., p d = 128, one has N pp ( n, 2 7 ) = 2 7n+4 . Next, consider the value of n. We have the following lemma (see Sec. The previous lemma implies that the maximal value of n is ω 1 (m) − 1. For the encryption scheme under study, it means that all encryption functions induced from polynomials of degree ω 1 (128) can be induced from a polynomial of degree ω 1 (128) − 1. In other words, ∀n ω 1 (128), it is true that N b ( n,
. As a result, we can assume that n ω 1 (128) 16 . Consequently, from Theorem 2, we can get the size of key space as follows:
That is, when n = ω 1 (128) − 1 = 7 the key space of the basic scheme is only 2 37 , which is much smaller than 128! ≈ 2 716 . When n < 7, the key space will be even smaller than 2 37 . As is well known, in today's digital computing speed, a key space of size 2 37 is far from being secure. 32 It is generally recommended that the key space should not be smaller than O(2 100 ). For the enhanced scheme, only f 1 should be a bijection over {1, · · · , 128} and other t−1 polynomial mappings can be arbitrary. Assume the number of distinct polynomial mappings of degree n modulo p d is N pm ( n, p d ). In a similar way as above, one can derive that
Thus, one can deduce that the key space of the enhanced scheme is not greater than 2 37 · 2 40(t−1) = 2 40t−3 , which is also much smaller than (128!) t ≈ 2 716t . Note that the key space will not be so large if the user only wants to break the first p (< t) subimages. In this case, the key space will be 2 40p−3 < 2 40t−3 . This means that the joint compression-encryption scheme has an increasing security distribution, not a uniform one, with respect to the position of the concerned sub-images. As is well known in cryptography, this is not a desirable property. 32 Regarding the non-uniform security of the enhanced scheme, it is meaningless to assign t as large as the number of all sub-images in order to enhance the security (as suggested in Sec. 3.3 of Ref. 4). For example, given a 512 × 512 image, assigning t = 512/3 × 512/3 can only provide 2 40 t/2 −3 possible keys for the top half of the image which, however, may contains almost all useful information of the whole image in some cases.
From the prior analysis, one can see that the key space is dependent on the values of n 1 , · · · , n t ∈ {1, · · · , ω 1 (128) − 1} and t ∈ Z + . Using polynomials of higher degrees and higher t is the way to increase the key space. However, since at least
are required for each subimage, there exists a tradeoff between the key space and the encryption speed. As a solution to this problem, one can store each polynomial mapping modulo 128 as a look-up table (LUT) with 128 input-output entries. Though these LUTs will occupy 256t bytes of additional memory, they are useful in dramatically increasing the encryption speed and relaxing the prior tradeoff. In this case, only t fast LUT operations are required for the encryption of each base value. However, even in this case the value of t should not be too large to achieve a sufficiently fast encryption speed. When the image is relatively large, it is generally impractical to assign t as large as the number of all subimages.
Chosen-Plaintext/Ciphertext Attack

Breaking the basic scheme
Breaking the look-up table with 128 chosen plain/cipher base values. Since the polynomial mapping f can be stored as a LUT in the encryption part, the LUT can be used as an equivalent of the secret key. By choosing the base values of 128 plain/cipher subimage as 1, · · · , 128, respectively, one can immediately recover all the 128 input-output entries of the LUT, which can then be used as an equivalent of the secret key for future encryption and decryption purposes. Apparently, this simple chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attack is essentially due to the extremely short block size of the encryption scheme. 32 To maintain a practical security in today's digital world, the modulus 128 should be increased to be 2 n , where n is cryptographically large (generally n 128 is recommended).
Breaking the encryption polynomial with 32 chosen plain base values. The previous simple chosenplaintext/ciphertext attack needs to choose all the 128 plain/cipher base values. In fact, by choosing only 32 plain base values, one can derive an equivalent polynomial of f (b) modulo 128 and further derive other 128 − 32 = 96 unknown input-output entries of the LUT. In the following, we focus on this advanced chosenplaintext attack. Note that this attack does not have a chosen-ciphertext counterpart 9 . In Sec. 5.4 of Ref. 11, an algorithm is given to determine all polynomials modulo p d that induce a given mapping over {0, · · · , p d − 1}, with less than p d input-output entries of the mapping. Apparently, this algorithm can be concretized for the encryption scheme under study to realize the advanced chosen-plaintext attack. In the following, we use Eq. (7) as the encryption function for a simpler discussion. Basically, the algorithm can be divided into three parts: 1. decomposing the original polynomial into a subpolynomial tree and getting the lowest coefficients of all subpolynomials with 32 chosen plain base values; 2. determining all the coefficients of the sub-polynomials; and 3. determining the coefficients of a polynomial equivalent to the original one modulo 128.
First, let us decompose the polynomial f (b) modulo 2 7 as follows.
•
Step 1a: decomposing f (b) modulo 2 7 . Assuming b = 2x 1 + b 0 , where b 0 = (b mod 2) ∈ {0, 1} and x 1 = b/2 , the polynomial f (b) becomes 2 subpolynomials of degree 6 modulo 2 7 = 128, as follows:
Note that the terms of x 1 of degree 7 vanish modulo 2 7 . Taking
from both sides of the prior congruence, one has
).
Step 1b: decomposing f * b0 (x 1 ) modulo 2 6 . In each f * b0 (x 1 ), assuming x 1 = 2x 2 +b 1 , where b 1 = (x 1 mod 2) ∈ {0, 1} and x 2 = x 1 /2 , one has four subpolynomials of degree 3 modulo 2 6 :
where
, and when 1 i 3, k
Note that the terms of x 2 of degree 4 vanish modulo 2 6 . Taking x 2 ≡ 0 (mod 2 5 ), one has k
from both sides, one has
(mod 2 5 ).
Step 1c: decomposing f * b1,b0 (x 2 ) modulo 2 5 . In each f * b1,b0 (x 2 ), assuming x 2 = 2x 3 + b 2 , where b 2 = (x 2 mod 2) ∈ {0, 1} and x 3 = x 2 /2 , one has eight subpolynomials of degree 2 modulo 2 5 :
, and when 1
. Similarly, taking x 3 ≡ 0 (mod 2 4 ), one has k
(mod 2 4 ).
Step 1d: decomposing f * b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ) modulo 2 4 . In each f * b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ), assuming x 3 = 2x 4 + b 3 , where b 3 = (x 3 mod 2) ∈ {0, 1} and x 4 = x 3 /2 , one has 16 subpolynomials of degree 1 modulo 2 4 :
(b3,b2,b1,b0) 1
and k
(1,b2,b1,b0) 1
With the previous decomposition, one can derive the undetermined coefficients of these subpolynomials from bottom to top in the following steps.
• Step 2a: determining f b3,b2,b1,b0 (x 4 ) modulo 2 4 . Taking x 4 ≡ 0 (mod 2 3 ), one can solve that k
4 ), and then choosing x 4 ≡ 0 (mod 2), one has 2k (b3,b2,b1,b0) 1
wherex 4 denotes an inverse of x 4 modulo 2 4 . Thus, f b3,b2,b1,b0 (x 4 ) is uniquely determined modulo 2 4 . Note that According to the definitions of all the involved sub-polynomials, with the 16 determined subpolynomials {f b3,b2,b1,b0 (x 4 )} 0 b0,b1,b2,b3 1 modulo 2 4 and the following 14 determined values:
one can uniquely determine the permutation polynomial f (b) modulo 2 7 . If the attacker only wants to reveal unknown input-output entries in the LUT, he can quit at this point.
Step 2b: determining f * b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ) modulo 2 4 and f b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ) modulo 2 5 . From the relation between
(mod 2 4 ) and
Considering that 2k
(b3,b2,b1,b0) 1 has been uniquely determined modulo 2 4 in the above step and that
(mod 2 4 ), we can get the following result:
has two candidate values modulo 2 4 . This means that k
has two candidates modulo 2 4 . So, f * b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ) has two candidate polynomials modulo 2 4 , i.e., f b2,b1,b0 (x 3 ) has two candidate polynomials modulo 2 5 .
Note that we calculate the value of 2 3 k (b2,b1,b0) 2 modulo 2 4 , instead of the value of k (b2,b1,b0) 2 modulo 2, to facilitate the following discussions (the same hereafter).
• Step 2c: determining f * b1,b0 (x 2 ) modulo 2 5 and f b1,b0 (x 2 ) modulo 2 6 . In a similar way, one can derive that
(mod 2 5 ) and
In the previous congruences, rows 1 & 2 lead to the result that 2 2 k
and rows 1 & 3 lead to 2 2 k
(mod 2 5 ). Substituting the results into the congruences, one has
That is, ∀b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1}, 2
is determined by k
has two candidate values modulo 2 4 and 2k
Substituting k
(mod 2 6 ) into the previous equation and then solve the sub-system formed by the first three congruences, one has
(1,b0) 0 + 9k
(10) The last congruence of Eq. (9) gives a constraint of the coefficients:
Since 2 2 k
(1,b0) 3
does not occur in Eq. (10), there always exists a unique solution for each candidate set of
modulo 2 6 when Eq. (11) holds. Assuming the number of all candidate polynomials of f b0 (x 1 ) obtained in this step is N , we show later that N = 2 8 = 256.
Finally, one can carry out the last step, step 3, to solve all equivalent polynomials of f (b) modulo 2 7 . Given a valid set of k
, the coefficients of f (b) can be uniquely solved modulo 2 7 . Without loss of generality, assume the polynomial is of degree n = 2 · 7 − 1 = 13 modulo 2 7 , i.e., the number of unknown coefficients is 14. Then, one obtains the following system of congruences:
where 
Thus, {k i } 0 i 13 can be uniquely solved modulo 2 7 , once B 0 and B 1 are both fixed modulo 2 7 . Solving this system of congruences, one arrives at the following set of solutions:
The previous equation shows that each valid set of k Though the prior procedure can output all 2 48 equivalent polynomials of f (b) of degree 13 modulo 2 7 , the complexity of deriving all equivalent polynomials is relatively high. Actually, it is sufficient to randomly take one equivalent polynomial as a representative. To do so, one can choose the first candidate polynomial f b0 (x 1 ) and randomly select one valid set of k 
Breaking the enhanced scheme
For the enhanced scheme with t polynomial mappings, each polynomial modulo 128 can be broken one by one, by carrying out the basic attack on the subimages one by one. Choose 32 plain images such that all base values of the i'th plain image are i. Then, the first secret polynomial, f 1 , can be broken via the basic chosen-plaintext attack, by working on the first base value of each plain image. Next, apply induction on the index of the subimage, j = 2 ∼ t. Since f 1 ∼ f j−1 have been successfully broken, they can be removed from the encryption function of the j'th base value. That is, the encryption of the j'th base value is reduced to be the basic scheme by the secret polynomial f i , so f i can be broken in the same way via the basic attack. Apparently, the computational complexity of the inductive attack is t times of the complexity of the basic attack.
Known-Plaintext Attack
The known-plaintext attack can be considered as a weak case of the previous chosen-plaintext attack. Once the attacker observes 32 plain base values that satisfy the requirement of the advanced chosen-plaintext attack, he can immediately carry out the attack to break the encryption scheme. Similarly, if the attacker can observe 128 distinct plain/cipher base values, he can immediately carry out the basic chosen-plaintext attack to recover the LUT as an equivalent key. Since a typical image may contain thousands of subimages 10 , one can easily collect enough base values with a high probability in real attacks.
Example of Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In the basic scheme, when the encryption function is f (b) = (1 + 3b + 2b
2 ) mod 128, let us try to find at least one permutation polynomial equivalent to f (b) modulo 128 via the prior chosen-plaintext attack by choosing 32 plain base values, b = 0, · · · , 31, and the 32 corresponding ciphertexts: {f (b)} 0 b 31 . We describe the attack step by step as follows.
In step 1a, we have the input-output entries of f (b), f 0 (x 1 ) and f 1 (x 1 ) shown in Table 1 . From these entries, we have k
0 ≡ f (1) ≡ 6 (mod 2 7 ), and the entries of f * b0 (x 1 ) 0 b0 1 modulo 2 6 shown in Table 2 . 10 For example, a 512 × 512 image has 28,900 subimages, which is much larger than 32, the number of required base values.
In step 1b, in a similar way, we have k Table 3 . Table 4 . 
